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The Strange Story of the Second Amendment in the 
Federal Courts, and Why It Matters* 
 
Lee Epstein and David T. Konig ** 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The “Second Amendment” is everywhere—on tee shirts, hats, signs, 
bumper stickers and even tattoos. Funny thing, though, is that few people 
seem to have actually read it; and when they do, they’re often confused.1 
That’s fair; the wording seems a little awkward. Then again, for most of 
our country’s history—actually until the 1990s—federal judges had no 
problem interpreting these 27 words: 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.2 
Regardless of their partisanship or ideology, judges agreed that the first 
part of the Amendment told the story. 3 Lacking (and distrusting) standing 
armies, the colonies organized their own militias to respond to 
emergencies.4  These citizen soldiers were expected to provide their own 
weapons and to muster regularly.5  As one New Englander remarked, the 
“near neighbourhood of the Indians and French quickly taught them the 
necessity of having a well regulated militia.”6  With independence, the 
ideal (if not the reality) lived on in the Second Amendment as a reassuring 
guarantee that citizens of the newly federated states would be able to stop 
the federal government from meddling with their state militias. For this 
 
*. Substantially revised version of a keynote talk delivered at “Approaches to the Gun Violence 
Crisis in the United States,” Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, Washington University School of 
Law, November 2, 2018. 
**.  Lee Epstein is the Ethan A.H. Shepley Distinguished University Professor at Washington 
University in St. Louis; David T. Konig is Professor Emeritus of History and Law at Washington 
University in St. Louis. We thank Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano and Eric Ruben & Joseph 
Blocher for sharing their data. 
1.  Or at least that’s our experience when we’ve delivered lectures to students and the public. 
2.  U.S. CONST., amend II. 
3.  See infra Part II.A. 
4.  SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA 13 (2006). 
5.  Id. at 12. 
6.  Id. at 13.  
Washington University Open Scholarship










148 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 60:147 
 
 
reason, federal judges uniformly saw the Second for what it was: a states’ 
rights amendment.  
Undergirding this traditional-consensual interpretation of the Second 
Amendment were two principles: (1) the Second Amendment does not 
touch the states; it’s designed to protect them; and (2) the Amendment 
prevents the federal government from enacting laws that impair state 
militias; the Amendment does not “reach the possession of firearms for 
purely private activities.”7  
Beginning in the late 1990s this long-standing consensus fell apart 
because some Republican-conservative judges, egged on by legal 
commentators, jettisoned the traditional approach in favor of one that 
emphasized the second half of the Amendment. That is, they read the 
Amendment to guarantee an individual right to keep and bear arms 
disconnected from service in state militias—a version anointed by its 
supporters as “the Standard Model.”8  
Almost needless to say: the Republican-conservative judges have won. 
No longer is the Second an assurance to the states; it now to protects the 
rights of individual gun owners. 
In what follows, we describe this shift, from judicial consensus over the 
states’ rights story to judicial polarization over the individual rights story. 
We then turn to the implications of the shift, some of which may seem 
surprising. Finally, considering present day realities, we discuss steps for 
forward movement—especially the role research can play in helping 
judges resolve the next generation of gun disputes. 
 
I. A (BRIEF) POLITICAL-EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 
 
Our goal in this section is not to recount the history of the Second 
Amendment in the federal courts; that’s been done—and done well—by 
many others.9 Rather we simply wish to contrast the once bi-partisan 
 
7. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 707 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
8. Glenn Harland Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 
(1995) (conferring the term “Standard Model”).  
9.   As historian Saul Cornell points out, however, “The growing support for the Standard Model 
among legal scholars contrasts with the cool reaction among early American historians.”  Rather, “the 
dominant trends in recent historiography point in the opposite direction.” Saul Cornell, Commonplace 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/11



















commitment to the traditional states’ rights account with current 
polarization over the individual rights story. Along the way, we make use 
of data we collected on every U.S. district and appellate court decision 
issued between 1876 and 2008 that implicated the Second Amendment.10 
 
A. Consensus Over the States’ Rights Story 
 
Through the 1990s, federal judges had few opportunities to interpret the 
Second Amendment.11 But when they did the judges overwhelmingly 
coalesced around the two principles we just laid out: (1) the Second 
Amendment has no effect on the ability of states to regulate guns and (2) 
the Amendment also allows the federal government to regulate guns 
unless its regulations touch on state militias. Taken together, these 
principles favor the states’ rights story of the Second Amendment and 
work against the individual rights account.  
Starting with the “no effect” approach of Principle 1, the Court held as 
much over 140 years ago in United States v. Cruikshank: 12 
 
This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to 
restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to 
 
or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in 
Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 222 (1999). Among those most 
widely accepted by historians are: ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA (2011); MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT (2014); PATRICK J. 
CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL MILITIAS TO 
CONCEALED CARRY (2018).  
10.  That is, between the Court’s decision in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), and 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). To develop the dataset, we conducted a search in 
Westlaw using the term “Second Amendment.” We focused exclusively on U.S. district court and 
court of appeals decisions, though we excluded en bancs and magistrate reports to district judges. After 
eliminating cases that did not address a Second Amendment claim on its merits, we were left with 553 
judge-votes in 261 cases. The 261 cases include reported/unreported and published/unpublished 
decisions. 
11.  See supra note 7. See also infra text accompanying notes 48-66 (discussing political and 
cultural reasons behind this change).  
12.  92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
Washington University Open Scholarship










150 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 60:147 
 
 
look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-
citizens of the rights it recognizes, to what is called… the “powers 
which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was, perhaps, 
more properly called internal police,” “not surrendered or 
restrained” by the Constitution of the United States. 13 
 
That’s what the Court said. What the opinion omitted is equally 
important.  It never used the word “militia,” relying instead on City of New 
York v. Miln14 and the states’ power to regulate in the common good (i.e., 
state police power). This language is noteworthy because it treats the 
regulation of firearms as a foundational (and back then, unquestionable) 
power reserved to the states. 
In cases coming on the heels of Cruikshank, the Court—by unanimous 
votes—continued to hew to the “no effect” principle under the police 
power justification. In Presser v. Illinois,15  concerning a state ban on 
armed parades, the Court held: 
 
the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in 
question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing 
arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for 
maintaining the public security, and disable the people from 
performing their duty to the general government.16 
 
In denying that Second Amendment applied to the states, the Court 
observed of the ban: 
 
The exercise of this power by the States is necessary to the public 
peace, safety, and good order.  To deny the power would be to deny 
the right of the State to disperse assemblages organized for sedition 
and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent on riot and 
rapine.17  
 
13.  Id. at 553 (quoting City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 103 (1837)). 
14.  36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
15.  116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
16.  Id. at 265. 
17.  Id. at 268. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/11




















To reinforce the “no effect” principle, the Court quoted Cruikshank’s18 
(and Miln’s) language on the “internal police” power of the states. Eight 
years later, in Miller v. Texas,19 it once again reiterated that the Second 
Amendment “operate[s] only upon the Federal power, and [has] no 
reference whatever to proceedings in state courts.” 
Some commentators20 explain away Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller as 
predating the “selective incorporation” doctrine under which the Court 
applied certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights to the states. To justify 
their questioning of these early precedents, the commentators point out 
that Cruikshank also rejected the application of First Amendment 
guarantees to the states—a holding the Court repudiated in the late 
1930s.21 
 
A problem with this justification is that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller 
retained their vitality for decades post the incorporation revolution. More 
to the point, even after the 1970s, when the Court had applied almost all 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights to the states,22 federal judges continued to 
 
18.  Id. at 265 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)).   
19.  153 U.S. 535 (1894). 
20.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620 n.23 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“With 
respect to Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we 
note that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not 
engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.”). 
21.  Cruikshank notes: 
 
The first amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from abridging “the right of the 
people to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” This, like the 
other amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers 
of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National 
government alone. 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). 
See also DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (applying the guarantee of assembly to the 
states); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (applying the guarantee of petition to the states). See LEE 
EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA 79, tbl.3-2 
(2019). 
22.  By 1978, the Court had incorporated all provisions of the Bill of Rights except the Second, 
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hold firm to Cruikshank et al.’s “no effect” principle. 
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove provides an example.23 Over a 
century after Cruikshank, the Seventh Circuit was asked whether the 
Second Amendment barred a village from prohibiting the possession of 
handguns within its borders. Quoting from Cruikshank and Presser in 
upholding the municipal ordinance, the court’s answer was a definitive 
reiteration of Principle 1: the Second Amendment has “no other effect than 
to restrict the powers of the National government.”24 A year later, in 
October 1983, the Supreme Court declined to review the panel’s decision 
without any Justice noting a dissent.25 
That Supreme Court, we hasten to note, was hardly full of lefties. To the 
contrary: 1983 was the 5th most conservative term of the 72 between 1946 
and 2017.26 Likewise, the author of the Quilici decision, William Bauer, 
was no liberal Democrat.27 The law-and-order minded Richard Nixon 
appointed him to a U.S. district court and Gerald Ford elevated him to the 
Seventh Circuit.  
Nor was Bauer’s opinion in Quilici unusual. Using Westlaw,28 we 
identified 56 judge-votes (in 30 cases) decided before 2000 that involved 
action taken by the states or localities. Only two of the 56 judges (both 
Reagan appointees) referenced an individual guarantee to keep and bear 
arms—and one located the guarantee in the right to privacy, not the 
 
Third, Fifth (grand jury hearings), Seventh, and Eighth (excessive bail and fines) Amendments. 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010). 
As we note later in the text, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the Court 
incorporated the Second Amendment; in 2019, the Court held that the excessive fines clause should be 
applied to the states. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
23.  695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982). 
24.  Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269 (7th Cir. 1982). 
25.  Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 863 
(1983).  
26.  The 1983 Court reached left-of-center decisions in only 41% of orally argued cases resolved 
with a signed opinion or judgment compared with 75% just twenty years earlier in 1963. 
WASHINGTON UNIV. LAW, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ 
(choose decisionType=1 or 7) (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). 
27.  Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of the Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit – Report, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 729 (1994) (noting that Judge Bauer defers to law 
enforcement more than colleagues).  
28.  See supra note 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/11



















Second Amendment.29 Twenty-one of the judges simply noted that the 
Amendment didn’t guarantee an individual right, while 33 wrote or joined 
opinions stating that it was unenforceable against the states. Of the 33 
judge votes, 58% were cast by Republican appointees (19 of 33)—
including seven Reagan appointees. 
These data focus on States’ Rights Principle 1: the enforcement of the 
Second Amendment against the states. What about the federal 
government? That goes to Principle 2, which says that the federal 
government also can regulate guns unless its regulations touch on state 
militias. 
Principle 2 follows from the 1939 case, United States v. Miller (1939),30 
which presented a challenge to the first major federal law to regulate guns, 
the National Firearms Act (NFA) of 1934.31 The NFA imposed a tax on 
certain lethal weapons, required their registration, and prohibited the 
shipment of unregistered guns in interstate commerce. 32 
Miller is interesting on several dimensions.33 But to bottom line it, the 
Court unanimously held that the NFA did not violate the Second 
Amendment. The majority opinion couldn’t have been clearer about the 
purpose of the Amendment, “With obvious purpose to assure the 
continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [state militias] the 
declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must 
be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”34  
 
29.  WASHINGTON UNIV. LAW, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ 
(choose) (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). Austin v. Neal, 933 F. Supp. 444, 452 (1996) (Waldman, J. 
claiming that “the Second Amendment may ensure the relatively unfettered access of law-abiding 
citizens”); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 280 (7th Cir. 1982) (Coffey, J., 
dissenting) (writing that “Morton Grove's prohibition of handgun possession within the confines of a 
person's own home has not been shown to be necessary to protect the public welfare and thus violates 
the fundamental right to privacy.”). 
30.   307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
31.  48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (currently codified at I.R.C. §§ 5801-5822). 
32.  Id. 
33.  For an interesting analysis of this case, see Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. 
Miller, 3 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 48 (2008).  
34.  Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
Washington University Open Scholarship










154 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 60:147 
 
 
Because there was no evidence that the weapon at issue—a sawed-off 
shotgun—had “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated militia,”35 the Court could not “say that the 
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an 
instrument” to a private individual. 36  
Worth highlighting, yet again, is the opinion author. By all accounts, 
James McReynolds was an über-conservative — and a justice certainly not 
timid about invalidating federal laws. But here in Miller he wrote for a 
unanimous court upholding the NFA.  
To us Miller clearly advances a states’ rights account of the Second 
Amendment — specifically Principle 2.37 As long as the federal 
government does not impair the right to keep and bear arms for certain 
military purposes, it can “regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of 
weapons.”38 
But you need not take our word for it. Data developed from pre-2000 
Second Amendment cases support Justice Stevens’ claim that that 
hundreds of judges relied on Miller for the proposition  “that the Second 
Amendment does not protect the right to possess and use guns for purely 
private, civilian purposes.”39 Of the 142 judge-votes cast in the 62 gun 
cases involving federal action, only 5 (3.5%) made some gesture toward 
an individual right to bear arms. And that number includes Heartsill 
Ragon, the FDR appointee whose decision was reversed in Miller; it also 
includes then-Judge Alito’s dissent in United States v. Rybar,40 which was 
grounded in the commerce clause, not the Second Amendment. 41 Nine 
judges did not specify an approach to the Second Amendment, though 
they uniformly ruled against the party alleging a Second Amendment 
claim. 
 
35.  Id.  
36.  Id.  
37.  But see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008) (claiming that Miller actually 
“positively suggests… that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms 
(though only arms that ‘have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia’)”) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). But, as we note in the text, 
among federal judges, Justice Scalia was in the minority to say the least. 
38.  Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
39.  Id. at 638 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
40.  103 F. 3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996). 
41.  Id. at 286 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/11



















That leaves 128 judge-votes (90%), all of which adopted a Miller-type 
approach. Typical along these lines is the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in 
Stevens v. United States:42 
Since the Second Amendment right ‘to keep and bear Arms’ applies 
only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the 
individual's right to bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any 
express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm. United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 
Judge Harry Phillips, the author of Stevens, was a John F. Kennedy 
appointee. But Republican appointees expressed precisely the same view. 
Writing for a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel in Hickman v. Block,43 Judge 
Cynthia Holcomb Hall, appointed by Reagan, echoed Phillips: 
The Court's understanding [in Miller] follows a plain reading of the 
Amendment's text. The Amendment's second clause declares that the goal 
is to preserve the security of “a free state;” its first clause establishes the 
premise that a  “well-regulated militia” is necessary to this end. Thus it is 
only in furtherance of state security that “the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms” is finally proclaimed.  
Following Miller, “[i]t is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a 
collective rather than an individual right.”44 
We have not cherry-picked these quotes. Our data show judges of all 
ideological and partisan stripes routinely upheld firearm laws citing Miller 
or related lower court decisions. This was as true of the Supreme Court 
justices—including the Nixon appointee Harry Blackmun in his more 
conservative days45—as it was of Republican and Democratic judges in 
the lower courts. Of the 128 judge-votes accepting Miller (again, 90% of 
 
42.  440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971). 
43. 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996). 
44.  Id. at 101–102. 
45.  Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (noting that the “legislative restrictions on 
the use of firearms” at issue “are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they 
trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.”) (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 
178 (1939) (“the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 
‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’”)). 
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all votes), 43% were cast by Republican appointees (including 15 by 
Nixon and 18 by Reagan appointees). Put another way, of the 67 
Republican votes in the 62 pre-2000 gun cases involving federal action, 
over 80% rejected the individual rights approach (over 90% if we include 
the 8 votes that didn’t specify an approach but nevertheless ruled against 
the claimant). 
Indeed, there was so much consensus in the courts over the states’ rights 
interpretation of the Second Amendment that a former Chief Justice of the 
United States went on television in 1991 to denounce as fraudulent the 
individual rights story being told by pro-gun groups.46 That Chief Justice 
was Warren Burger, a Nixon appointee who was, by some rankings, even 
more conservative than McReynolds.47 
 
B. Polarization Over the Individual Rights Story 
 
Of course, Burger’s wasn’t the last word on the meaning of the Second 
Amendment. Beginning in the late 1990s, the bipartisan-judicial consensus 
over the states’ rights story began to disappear. What happened? 
Lawyers and law scholars happened.48 Turning to historical materials 
and originalist methodologies they began publishing law review articles 
claiming that the traditional states’ rights approach was much weaker than 
the courts were letting on.49  
You may be able to predict what happened next. The scholars and 
various interest groups began airing their views in public outlets and using 
 
46.  Frank Staheli, Warren Burger “2nd Amendment Fraud” – 1991 PBS News Hour, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eya_k4P-iEo.  
47.  E.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES 108–09 tbl.3.2 (2013).  
48.  To this sentence commentators could plausibly add the NRA and other gun rights groups 
because these organizations were directly or indirectly responsible for some law review articles 
advocating an individual rights interpretation. See Carl T. Bogus,  The History and Politics of Second 
Amendment Scholarship, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2000). We do not take issue with this fact but 
neither do we think it is especially relevant as long as research meets the standards the academic 
community uses to assess research, the authors’ identity, affiliations, and funding sources should not 
matter. See Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Academic Integrity and Legal Scholarship in the Wake of 
Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2010). See infra Part III.C. 
49.  Bogus, supra note 48, at 5 (writing that the first law review article—a student note—advocating 
against the traditional states’ rights approach appeared in 1960). Pro-individual rights scholarship 
picked up notably in the 1980s into the 1990s. Id. at 8, 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/11



















anti-states’ rights law review articles as the basis for amicus curiae 
briefs.50 And, lo and behold, conservative-Republican judges started citing 
those articles —both in the lower courts and the Supreme Court—to justify 
jettisoning the conventional-consensus approach to the Second 
Amendment in favor of a radical reinterpretation: that the Amendment 
guaranteed an individual right to keep and bear arms.  
Prominent signs came in two opinions in the late 1990s, though special 
circumstances in each prevented the authors from establishing the 
unequivocal individual right to bear arms that gun advocates sought.  In 
United States v. Gomez, a convicted drug dealer pled guilty to being a 
felon in possession of a firearm. After the trial court denied his motion to 
introduce evidence of justification, he appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  
Writing for the panel, Judge Alex Kozinski, a Reagan appointee, cited a 
1987 law review article claiming that “[t]he Second 
Amendment embodies the right to defend oneself and one's home against 
physical attack.”51 Kozinski nonetheless went on to follow precedent, 
writing that cases such as Gomez’s “have almost always been analyzed in 
terms of justification.”52  Here, Gomez lived under the threat of death after 
 
50 . See, e.g., 
   
Of 41 law review articles published since 1980 which offer substantial discussion of the 
Amendment, just four take the states' right-only position. Their quality does not exceed their 
quantity… In contrast, articles accepting the Amendment as an individual right are published on 
their own merits and in top rank law reviews. 
 
Brief for the Academics of the Second Amendment et al., as Amicus Curiae at 11–12, United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994) (No. 93-1260). 
This numerical accounting is open to serious doubt, both as to quality and quantity claimed. See 
Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 
(2000). Spitzer provides a full bibliography that includes book-length studies published from 1912 to 
1999. Id. at 389–95. If only those between 1980 and 1994 (when Lopez was decided) are counted, 
Spitzer identifies 40 accepting the individual right and 28 the collective view. Id.  
51. United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 774 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nelson Lund, The Second 
Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117–120, 130 
(1987) (arguing that the Second Amendment guarantees right to means of self-defense)). 
52.  Id. at 774. 
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his release from prison and was constantly “running for his life.”53   
A year later, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
provision of the Brady Act requiring state law enforcement officers to 
enforce an instant background check on firearms purchases. Writing for 
the majority, Justice Scalia’s opinion rested not on the Second 
Amendment but on states’ rights grounds: Such a “commandeering” of 
state officers’ authority violated the residual authority of the states, 
contrary to the enumerated powers specified in Article I, §8, as well as the 
Tenth Amendment’s “assertion that the powers not delegated to the United 
States Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved to the 
states respectively, or to the people.”54 
But the anchor of the Court’s right-wing, Clarence Thomas, took the 
opportunity to opine on the Second Amendment, suggesting that Kozinski 
was not alone in thinking that it established an individual right. In his 
concurrence in Printz, (joined by no other justice),55 Thomas suggested 
that “If… the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to 
“keep and bear arms,” a colorable argument exists that the Federal 
Government's [effort to regulate] the purely intrastate sale or possession of 
firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's protections.”56  
Thomas and Kosinski are the most prominent but certainly not the only 
examples of a change in thinking about the meaning of the Second 
Amendment among Republican judges. Our data show that between 2000 
and 200857 62 judge-votes, out of a total of 355 (17%), were against a state 
rights’ interpretation of the Second Amendment. Republican appointees 
cast 49 of the 62 (79%). Put another way, of the Democratic appointees’ 
140 votes only 9% favored an individual rights interpretation; that figure 
was 23% for Republican appointees (49/215). 
Among those Republicans was Judge William Lockhart Garwood, a 
Reagan appointee to the Fifth Circuit, who accomplished what Kosinski 
and Thomas did not: he articulated and applied the individual rights 
rationale to decide a case, United States v. Emerson.58 After Emerson had 
 
53.  Id. at 773. 
54.  United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997). 
55.  Id. at 936 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
56.  Id. at 938 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
57.  Before Heller. 
58.  270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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threatened his estranged wife, she obtained a temporary restraining order, 
which, under federal law barred him from possessing a firearm. Emerson 
challenged the federal ban on the ground that he needed the weapon for his 
own self-defense. Such a personal right, he argued, was guaranteed by the 
Second Amendment independent of militia service.59  
Writing for the three-judge panel, Garwood agreed, dismissing the 
preamble and its connection to militia service: “[S]uch an interpretation is 
contrary to the plain meaning of the of the text of the guarantee, its 
placement within the Bill of Rights and the wording of other articles 
thereof and the original meaning of the Constitution as a whole.”60 The 
Amerndment, he wrote, had no “military connotation”: 
 
The plain meaning of the right of the people to keep and bear arms 
is that it is an individual, rather than a collective, right, and is not 
limited to keeping arms while engaged in active military service or 
as a member of a select militia such as the National Guard.61   
 
In so holding, Emerson became the first decision at any level of the 
federal courts to recognize the individual right interpretation of the Second 
Amendment.   
That interpretation did not go unnoticed. Although one member of the 
panel, the George H.W. Bush appointee Harold R. DeMoss, Jr., joined 
Garwood’s opinion, another, Robert M. Parker (a Clinton appointee) did 
not. In a partial concurrence explaining his decision not to join the Second 
Amendment part of the opinion, Parker wrote that Garwood’s 
interpretation of the Second Amendment amounted to “dicta and not and is 
therefore not binding on us or any other court.” 62 Nonetheless, the genie 
was out of the bottle. 
 
59. Id. at 211–12. 
60.  Id. at 233. 
61.  Id. at 232. 
62.  Id. at 272. 
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Considering these developments, perhaps it was inevitable that the 
question of the Second Amendment’s meaning would return to the 
Supreme Court; and it did in the 2008 case of District of Columbia v. 
Heller.63 At issue in Heller was a Washington, D.C. law which, with 
narrow exceptions, effectively banned gun ownership by private 
individuals.64 In a 5-4 vote—with the conservatives (all Republican 
appointees) in the majority and the liberals in dissent (the Democratic 
appointees plus Souter and Stevens)—the Court invalidated the District’s 
law.  
Written by Justice Scalia, the Heller opinion has been called a 
quintessential example of originalism. That is, just like the law review 
articles that brought us the individual rights approach to the Second 
Amendment, Scalia’s Heller opinion is based almost exclusively on his 
reading of historical materials. And those materials led him to deem the 
Amendment’s preamble merely a “prefatory clause” that did not control 
the next “operative clause.” From that reading a definitive conclusion 
followed: “There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and 
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep 
and bear arms.”65   
With these words, not only was consensus thrown out the window; 
recall the 5-4 liberal-conservative split on the Court. In supplanting the 
states’ rights interpretation with the individual rights story, Scalia also 
erased Miller’s long-standing Principle #2 because the District of 
Columbia is ultimately controlled by the federal government.  
What about the Principle 1—concerning the ability of states to regulate 
guns? Two years after Heller, the Court blue-penciled that too in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago. Again, by an ideologically polarized vote of 
5-4, the Court overruled Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller, holding that the 
Second Amendment was not only a constraint on the federal government 
but also on the states.  
With McDonald the doctrinal disruption was complete: from long-
 
63.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
64.  See Edward D. Jones, III, The District of Columbia’s “Firearms Control Act of 1975”: The 
Toughest Handgun Control Law in the United States – Or Is It? 455 ANNALS AM. SOC’Y POL. & SOC. 
SCI., 138 (1981) (gives a detailed examination of this law). 
65.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
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standing consensus over the states’ rights account to ideological-partisan 
polarization over the individual right story. The divisions are obvious in 
the U.S. Supreme Court but they’re also evident in the lower courts. Using 
Samaha and Germano’s dataset,66 which records U.S. appellate court votes 
in five legal areas (including gun rights), we calculated the percentage of 
support for the claimant by the party of the appointing president. As the 
results displayed in Figure 1 make clear, litigation over the Second 
Amendment now joins abortion and affirmative action as among the most 
polarizing areas in the courts today. In all three the difference between 
Democratic and Republican appointees is statistically significant at p < 
.01. 
 
66.  Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Is the Second Amendment a Second-Class Right?,68 DUKE 
L.J. 57, 66 (2018).  
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Figure 1. U.S. Court of Appeals Judges’ Votes in Favor of the Claimant 
in Five Legal Areas, 2008-2016 
 
Data Source: Samaha and Germano.67  
Notes: * indicates a statistically significant difference at p < 0.01. Includes 
only civil cases; includes en banc votes.  
 
 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT 
 
That’s the shifting meaning of the Second Amendment in the Supreme 
Court. But what are the shift’s implications for law and public policy? 
Believe it or not, many knowledgeable people say there are no 
implications: that the move from states’ rights to individual rights was 
interesting but otherwise amounted to a purely academic debate between 
liberal and conservative justices and lawyers over the meaning of the 
Second Amendment. As Sanford Levinson, a constitutional law professor, 
put it, “Heller will more likely than not turn out to be of no significance to 
anyone but constitutional theorists.”68 The distinguished scholar of the 
 
67.  Id. 
68.  Adam Liptak, Few Ripples from Supreme Court Ruling on Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2009), 
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Second Amendment, Adam Winkler,69 agreed: “The Heller case is a 
landmark decision that has not changed very much at all.”70  
Why do they say this? For two related reasons. First, although lower 
court judges have divided along partisan lines, on balance they’ve been 
reluctant to overturn gun-control laws. Figure 1 suggests as much, as does 
Samaha and Germano’s study. Comparing the votes of judges in civil gun 
cases and and in the four other areas of constitutional law displayed in 
Figure 1,71  Samaha and Germano concluded that “gun rights claims 
generally underperform.”72 That may understate the case. Overall, since 
2008 only 14% of the judges’ votes were in favor of the claimant in gun 
cases; in all others, the percentage was 43.73 Ruben and Blocher’s research 
makes a similar point. Of the 1,153 Second Amendment challenges to gun 
restrictions in federal and state courts between Heller and February 2016, 
they found that a measly 9% (108) succeeded (though the figure was 
higher for federal appellate courts, at 13%, or 29 of 221).74  
The second reason commentators say “Heller is firing blanks”75 
implicates the U.S. Supreme Court. Although Heller and McDonald 
established an individual right to bear arms, the decisions left open many 
questions about the constitutionality of other regulations, notably bans on 
concealed weapons and waiting periods for gun sales. Ruben and 
Blocher’s data suggest that lower courts have answered these questions 
mostly by upholding whatever restriction is at issue. The Supreme Court, 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/17bar.html (quoting Sanford Levinson).  
69.  See, e.g., ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA (2011); Adam Winkler, Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?, 93 IND. L.J. 253 
(2018).  
70.  Adam Liptak, Few Ripples from Supreme Court Ruling on Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/17bar.html (quoting Adam Winkler). 
71.  Commercial speech, abortion rights, establishment clause, and anti-affirmative action. 
72.  Samaha & Germano, supra note 16, at 66. 
73.  Calculated from Samaha & Germano’s data (includes en banc votes). 
74.  Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1473 tbl.1 (2018). 
75.  Adam Liptak, Few Ripples from Supreme Court Ruling on Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/17bar.html.  
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in contrast, hasn’t bothered to answer them at all: Between McDonald and 
2019, it declined to hear a Second Amendment case.76 The silence didn’t 
go unnoticed. Justice Thomas filed several dissents from the Court’s 
refusal to hear gun cases;77 and Alan Gura, who successfully argued both 
Heller and McDonald, commented that the lack of clarity in the opinions 
means that “we are the very beginning of the post-Heller, post-McDonald 
process.”78   
Why did the Court seemingly remove itself from this area of the law? 
There are several theories but most likely the inaction traced to Justice 
Kennedy. He joined the majority in invalidating the restrictions in 
McDonald and Heller, but how he would vote in the next generation of 
Second Amendment cases remained something of a mystery to justices on 
the left and right. Their uncertainty, in turn, likely traced to this passage in 
Scalia’s otherwise originalist opinion in Heller:  
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of 
the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.79  
No closer observer of the Court thought that Scalia wanted these words 
in his opinion; he apparently added them to secure Kennedy’s vote. As 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times, 
recounted it: Justice Stevens, a supporter of the traditional states’ rights 
account, “helped persuade” Kennedy to ask Scalia for “some important 
 
76.  In January 2019, the Court agreed to hear arguments in a challenge to New York City’s ban on 
transporting a handgun outside city limits in its October 2019 term. See New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2nd Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S.Ct. 939 (U.S. Jan 22, 
2019) (No. 18-280); New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2nd Cir. 
2018), petition for cert. filed, 2018 WL 4275878 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2018) (No. 18-280). 
77.  E.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. 
Feb. 20, 2018) (No. 17-342) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Peruta v. California, 824 F.3d 919, (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3597 (No. 16-894) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Gorsuch, J., concurring 
in dissent).  
78.  AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE 
CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 58 (2015).  
79.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
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changes” to his opinion, specifically that the majority opinion “should not 
be taken to cast doubt” on many kinds of gun control laws.80 
Assuming the Court’s silence reflected uncertainly over Kennedy’s 
vote, the implications of Heller/McDonald may be realized soon. With the 
Kavanaugh-for-Kennedy swap, there is far less uncertainty about votes 
over gun regulations81—meaning that the Court in the not-so-distant future 
could start hearing challenges to concealed weapon bans, waiting periods, 
and the like82—and begin invalidating them by votes of 5-4 along party 
lines. No longer may Heller be firing blanks. 
 
III. HOW TO CHALLENGE THE NEW LEGAL REGIME 
 
If you’re pleased by the prospect of the Court invalidating many 
restrictions on guns—not to mention continued polarization in the federal 
courts—you can stop reading. But if you’re unhappy with the new legal 
regime and a polarized judiciary, what can be done? 
 
A. Repeal the Second Amendment 
 
Retired Justice John Paul Stevens83—like Chief Justice Burger before 
him84—has advocated repeal of the Second Amendment. Maybe that was 
 
80.  Adam Liptak, “It’s a Long Story”: Justice John Paul Stevens, 98, Is Publishing a Memoir, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/us/politics/john-paul-stevens-
memoir.html.  
81.  In fact then-Judge Kavanaugh was part of a three judge panel that heard a subsequent lawsuit 
brought by the same plaintiff from Heller. There he dissented from the panel opinion authored by 
Reagan appointee Douglas Ginsburg and argued that the District of Columbia’s ban on semi-automatic 
rifles and gun registration requirements violated the Second Amendment. Heller v. District of 
Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
82.  See supra note 76. 
83.  John Paul Stevens, Opinion, John Paul Stevens: Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-
amendment.html.  
84.  Russell Berman, Where the Gun-Control Movement Goes Silent, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/guns-second-amendment-repeal/554540/ 
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plausible in 1991 when Burger appeared on television. But not today. 
Whether Heller was the cause or not, Americans are just too politically 
polarized over guns to make realistic repeal of the Second Amendment. 
Figure 2 below, developed from Pew surveys,85 shows the percentage of 
Republicans and Democrats who think it’s more important to protect the 
right of Americans to own guns than to control gun ownership since 1993.  
 
Figure 2. Percentage Democratic and Republican Respondents 
Believing It’s More Important to Protect the Right of Americans to Own 
Guns than to Control Gun Ownership, 1993-2017  
 




Sure, there’s always been a divide between Republicans (in black) and 
Democrats (in grey). But note first, that in 1993 neither a majority of 
Republicans nor Democrats favored gun ownership over gun control. And, 
second, the gap between the two was only 20 percentage points in 1993; 
today it’s 59. Indeed, Americans are now more polarized over guns than 
 
(quoting Chief Justice Burger).  
85.  Public Views About Guns, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: U.S. POLITICS & POL’Y (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.people-press.org/2017/06/22/public-views-about-guns/#party. 










1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
year

























any other issue, save President Trump’s wall.86 
Considering these data, securing the necessary two-thirds of Congress 
and three-fourths of the states to ratify a repeal Amendment seems 
downright Quixotic.  
 
B. Legal-Historical Pushback on McDonald 
 
Although Heller and McDonald left many questions unanswered and 
considerable confusion in their wake, much less uncertainty now exists 
over the Supreme Court: as we just mentioned, the 5-4 conservative 
majority on the Supreme Court will be more receptive to gun rights.  Any 
strategy to mitigate the onrush of pro-gun legislation or protect restrictions 
must accept that.   
One avenue can— perhaps must— be grounded in history, 
jurisprudence, policy, and the prevailing political tilt of the conservative 
post-Reagan Republican judicial legacy.  A successful strategy would 
combine the Court’s acceptance of “long-standing” parameters of firearms 
regulation and the tradition of federalism that has recognized spheres of 
authority vested in the states since the Founding.  This strategy would 
invoke the states’ power to regulate in the common good (“police 
power”)—a power understood to be reserved to them under the Tenth 
Amendment—as well as a long legal tradition of allowing states to place 
limits on individual rights in the interest of public health and safety.  
Because we lack the space to develop this argument in detail, suffice it 
to note here that we agree with commentary suggesting that the 
Heller/McDonald individual right to keep and bear arms should not treat 
the circumstances of life in rural-urban environments the same when 
firearms are concerned, nor deny local governments the right to enact laws 
for their citizens’ health and safety.  Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a 
conservative Reagan appointee to the Fourth Circuit, made this point in his 
 
86.  See Harry Enten, The U.S. Has Never Been So Polarized on Guns, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 4, 
2017, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-u-s-has-never-been-so-polarized-on-guns/. 
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critique of Heller, noting that “establishing a more uniform national gun 
policy would be particularly improvident because gun regulations are so 
uniquely tied to the different views and conditions among regions, 
individual states, and even smaller units of government.”87 
 
C. Bring in the Social Scientists 
 
As we’ve suggested, transformation of the Second Amendment—from 
protecting states’ rights to protecting individual rights—was fueled by 
research, though research of a very particular kind: “originalism,” or 
reading old documents. This could be a plausible interpretive methodology 
but it has become, to quote a prominent law scholar, so “radicalized and 
weaponized by conservative activists”88 that its reliability is open to 
question to say the least. 
Still if “research” brought us the current legal regime over guns—the 
individual rights story— then the best way to challenge it or at least limit 
its application may be to fight fire with fire: not solely by reading old 
documents but by designing and conducting empirical studies to assess 
present-day conditions. No longer should legal turf be completely ceded to 
18th century documents when real-time prudential and policy concerns are 
also highly relevant to the debate.  
Of course there are already many interesting and high-quality 
studies89—and, in fact, there are more and more each year despite 
substantial cuts in federal funding for gun research.90 Also without doubt 
these studies are crucial for the development of sensible gun policy. But if 
judges ultimately invalidate the resulting policies because that’s what old 
documents tell them to do, then the studies are in vain. 
 
87. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 
253, 315 (2009) (citations omitted).  
88.  Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 
326 (2009). 
89.  E.g., Arindrajit Dube, Oeindrila Dube, & Omar García-Ponce, Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. 
Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 397 (2013); Emilio Depetris-Chauvin, 
Fear of Obama: An Empirical Study of the Demand for Guns and the U.S. 2008 Presidential Election, 
130 J. PUB. ECON. 66 (2015); Nathan Irvin, et al., Evaluating the Effect of State Regulation of 
Federally Licensed Firearm Dealers on Firearm Homicide, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1384 (2014). 
90.  See Philip J. Cook & John J. Donohue, Saving Lives by Regulating Guns: Evidence for Policy, 
358 SCI. 1259, 1259 (2017).  
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To turn the judges’ gaze from the 1700s to the 21st century, we must 
produce studies that will speak to them—studies with at least three 
characteristics. First, and most obvious, the research should be aimed at 
the specific regulation at issue in the court case. If the case is about a 
restriction on carrying concealed weapons, then the research should assess, 
for example, the effect of the adoption of right-to-carry laws on crime. 
Second, the studies must be as bullet proof as is possible for research 
making causal inferences from observational data. For judges, that means 
research that is reliable, valid, and transparent.91  
A threshold requirement in empirical research, reliability is the extent to 
which it is possible to replicate a measurement—reproducing the same 
value on the same standard for the same subject at the same time.92 
Obviously, we can’t expect judges and lawyers to retrace or even review 
all the steps in every study. What researchers can do instead is signal their 
commitment to reliability by adhering to the replication standard.93 This 
standard commits researchers to supplying enough information about their 
study—including their data—so that a third party could replicate the 
results without any additional information from the author.  
Validity is the extent to which a reliable measure reflects the underlying 
concept being measured. Because assessing validity is even harder for 
judges than assessing reliability, scholars could signal their commitment to 
validity by subjecting their studies to peer review.  
As for transparency the idea here is to lay bare not only the funders of 
the research but also the relevant organizational affiliations of the 
researchers. Some pro-gun historical studies have been criticized for not 
revealing their sponsors;94 empirical studies can easily avoid the same fate 
by being above board. 
 
91.  See Epstein & Clarke, supra note 48, at 33. 
92. For more details on reliability, as well as the other criteria, see LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. 
MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (2014). 
93. Gary King, Replication, Replication, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 444 (1995) (explaining what the 
replication standard is and its importance). 
94.  See Bogus, supra note  48, at 8 n.28.  
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Finally, researchers must be able to communicate their methods and 
results to lawyers who can in turn explain the studies to judges. This is 
absolutely critical. It’s easy for judges to understand historical arguments 
but far harder for them to give meaning to words like “p-values,” 
“synthetic controls,” “regression,” and on and on. No matter how great the 




How to develop novel legal arguments and how to conduct and make 
plain data-driven research are challenges. But only by undertaking them—
and transmitting any new knowledge to lawyers and, ultimately, policy 
makers and judges—can we begin to make progress toward the 
development of sensible principles to guide gun policy. 
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